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PROPERTY TAX CIRCUIT-BREAKERS IN NEW YORK STATE:
A POLICY ANALYSIS1" 
by
Bert Mason1^  and Eric Gabler^
Rapidly rising levels of property taxation and growing concerns about
the burdens these taxes place on particular groups of taxpayers have led to
widespread adoption of property tax relief programs for households. At
present, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have some form of
property tax relief program for the elderly, and many extend coverage to
1/the non-elderly
Although specific exemptions such as the homestead exemption are the
most universal form of property tax relief, circuit-breakers are the most
rapidly growing type of relief program. The first circuit-breaker program
was initiated by Wisconsin in 1964. By mid-1978 , thirty states and the
2/District of Columbia had circuit-breaker laws.— New York State adopted 
circuit-breaker legislation in March 1978. Property tax circuit-breakers
t Helpful comments by Mike Lea, Edward J. Lilly, Ronald Pederson, Lois 
Plimpton, and Louis Tomson are gratefully acknowledged.
tt Bert Mason is currently a senior economist at the Solar Energy 
Research Institute in Golden, Colorado, At the time this paper was 
written, he was an assistant professor in the Department of Agri­
cultural Economics, Cornell University.
Eric Gabler is a graduate research assistant in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Cornell University.
1/ Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Property Tax 
Circuit-Breakers: Current Status and Policy Issues Washington, D.C.:
February, 1975.
2/ John Shannon and Frank Tippett, "An Analysis of State Personal Income 
Tax and Property Tax Circuit-Breakers," unpublished paper presented at 
the 46th Annual Meeting of the National Association of Tax 
Administrators, Boston, June 1978, pp. 10-18, See Appendix A.
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are tax relief programs designed to protect household income from "exces­
sive" property tax burdens. Although design of specific circuit—breaker 
legislation varies among the states,,circuit-breakers generally grant 
partial or complete relief from "excess" property taxes when they exceed a 
specific percentage of household income* Property tax relief is usually 
given as a cash refund, direct reduction of the property tax bill, or as a 
tax credit against state income taxes.
Proponents of circuit—breakers claim that they can rectify many of the 
purported ills of the real property tax, namely excess burden, regress — 
ivity, and interjurisdictional fiscal disparities. Opponents respond that 
circuit-breakers represent short-term relief rather than true reform and 
that benefits are distributed largely to individuals least in need of 
relief.
Regardless of one's perspective on the desirablility of circuit- 
breaker programs, it is clear that widespread momentum for adoption exists. 
It is also true that circuit-breakers offer a politically attractive 
response to demands to "do something about the property tax. In an 
atmosphere that creates strong desires among public officials to provide 
immediate and visible response, it is not surprising that adoption is 
rarely preceded by careful analysis of potential impacts and available 
alternatives.
The purposes of this paper are to provide a general background on 
circuit—breakers and discuss some important policy issues which face public 
officials considering property tax relief and reform, particularly in New 
York State. The intent is to catalyze discussion rather than pose defini­
tive answers to the complex issues involved in property taxation.
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Objectives and Design of Property Tax Circuit-Breakers 
In the thirty-one states (including the District of Columbia) that 
have circuit-breakers, program design in terms of coverage and extent of 
relief varies widely.—  ^ This variation makes it difficult to provide a 
concise and specific definition for circuit-breakers. Generally, all 
circuit-breaker programs seek to alleviate "excessive" property tax burdens 
by linking property tax liabilities for homeowners and/or renters to 
current annual household income.—  ^ The usual justification for circuit- 
breakers is that they will alleviate purported regressivity of the property 
tax for low-income households and reduce interjurisdictional disparities in 
tax bases. Circuit-breakers are usually financed by state taxes, although 
a few states require local financing through direct reduction in property 
tax bills.
It should be noted that the term "circuit-breaker" is somewhat
misleading. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)
poses an analogy between property tax and electrical circuit-breakers:
"Property tax circuit-breakers are tax relief programs designed to protect
family income from property tax 'overload' the same way that an electrical
„ 5/circuit-breaker protects the family from current overload. — This analogy 
is not entirely accurate, since the property tax circuit-breaker does not 
completely shut down the "current," but instead allows a flow of property 
tax payments at some level legislated as acceptable. Moreover, any
_3/ This section relies heavily on the Advisory Commission on Inter­
governmental Relations, op. cit.
4/ In 1974, Michigan extended circuit-breaker coverage to farms as well 
as owners of residential property.
5/ ACIR, ibid., p. 2.
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reduction in property taxes via a circuit-breaker is shifted to some other 
revenue source in the tax system* The property tax circuit-breaker there­
fore operates more as "relay" than a "circuit—breaker," since it shifts tax 
liabilities to other taxpayers.
Circuit-breakers are quite flexible in application and can be designed 
to achieve a wide variety of legislative objectives* The impact that a 
particular circuit—breaker program will have on alleviating excess burden, 
regressivity, and revenue disparities among jurisdictions depends on 
specific design features of the program. Important considerations in 
designing a circuit—breaker include eligibility, income ceilings and extent 
of property tax relief. Alternative approaches to formula and program 
design are sketched in the following section.
Relief Formulae. There are basically two types of relief formulae 
used in calculating "excess" property tax burdens for circuit—breaker 
programs. These are labelled the threshold and sliding scale approaches by 
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
The threshold approach uses a given percentage of income as the 
maximum acceptable amount of property tax a household may be expected to 
pay. In practice, this percentage, or threshold, varies directly with 
income. Low incomes may have, for example, a three percent threshold, 
while higher incomes may climb progressively to four, five, and six percent 
thresholds. Any amount exceeding the threshold is called excessive, and 
this amount is rebated either completely or in part to the taxpayer under 
the relief provisions of the circuit-breaker.
The sliding scale approach does not use a percentage of income 
criterion. Income classes are established, and for each income class a set 
percentage of property tax paid is rebated. For example, property taxes
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may be reduced by ten percent for families with less than $3,000 income* 
Under this approach, the percentage rebated declines as higher income 
classes are reached. Whether property tax liability is initially high or 
low in relation to household income is not a factor.
The differences between these two approaches, according to the ACIR
are:
The threshold approach
(a) rests solely upon the ability-to-pay concept, and can 
better target relief in accordance with this principle;
(b) can make the residential property tax proportional 
below a given income level, or even progressive over a 
rather broad income range; (c) grants greater benefits, 
everything else equal, to residents of high spending 
jurisdictions; and (d) grants greater benefits, everything 
else equal, to occupants of high value homes vis—a—vis low 
value homes (thus, the threshold approach tends to encour­
age overconsumption of ho using to a greater extent than 
the sliding-scale approach).
The sliding scale approach
(a) maintains interjurisdictional tax differentials, con­
sistent with the benefits-received principle of taxation 
(the notion that tax payments should be in proportion to 
benefits) where tax differentials reflect service differ­
entials; (b) maintains tax differentials among occupants 
of homes having different values (thereby minimizing the 
circuit breaker1 s stimulus to housing consumption) ;
(c) maintains tax differentials that arise from inter- 
jurisdictional tax base differentials (property— poor 
jurisdictions must levy higher tax rates than property- 
rich jurisdictions to provide the same level of service 
and the sliding-scale approach maintains these differ­
entials to a greater extent than the threshold approach); 
and (d) assures that the taxpayer shares in tax increases 
so that his share of the cost of government service in­
creases does not go to zero (built-in "co- insurance ), 
thereby preserving the taxpayer's incentive to weigh the 
benefits of proposed increases and to consider whether he 
wishes to support them.6/
In evaluating these two approaches, ACIR. concludes that the threshold 
approach is the more direct and cost-effective alternative for providing
6/ Ibid, pp. 9-10.
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relief for excess burden. ACIR maintains that the threshold approach is 
preferable to the sliding-scale because it reduces the impact of inter- 
jurisdictional tax base disparities.
Steven Gold, however, defends the sliding-scale formula on the basis
that "the sliding-scale gives relatively more relief to households at each
income level with lower property taxes; the threshold gives relatively more
..7 /relief to households at each income level with higher property taxes."—
Gold proposes that the sliding-scale allows for greater vertical equity by 
guaranteeing that higher income households will not receive benefits when 
lower income households do not and that the sliding- scale minimizes the 
tendency for households of greater wealth to receive greater benefits under 
circuit-breaker programs. Gold argues the sliding scale is preferable if 
property ownership is considered: 1) to reflect a family’s preference for
housing over other goods; 2) as a method of holding wealth; or 3) to 
reflect a desire in high-tax districts to have access to greater services 
that district might provide. If high property taxes are the result of a 
district's relatively poor property tax base, or the housing requirements 
of a large family, Gold suggests these equity problems are better addressed 
by intergovernmental fiscal transfers than by circuit-breaker relief.
The sliding-scale approach has the advantage of insuring taxpayer 
responsibility in voting for local spending, since qualified taxpayers must 
share a portion of any increase in property taxes. This "responsibility" 
factor can be built into threshold circuit-breakers by adding a "co- 
insurance restriction." Coinsurance means that less than 100 percent of
JJ Steven Gold, "A Note on the Design of Property Tax Circuit-Breakers, 
National Tax Journal (December 1976), pp. 477-481.
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property tax in excess of the threshold is refunded. Voter responsibility 
can therefore be maintained under either formula.
Coverage. Eligibility for benefits is decided in part by the income 
criterion for relief incorporated into the formula. Under the sliding- 
scale approach, eligibility and extent of relief are usually stratified by 
income class until a maximum income ceiling is reached, beyond which no 
benefits can be claimed. Although the threshold formula requires no income 
classes in theory, threshold percentages usually increase and rebate 
percentages usually decline as income rises. Further, most states legis­
late maximum income ceilings for eligibility.
In practice, states often limit coverage by criteria other than income 
and property tax payments. Age of the head of the household and occupancy 
status are often used in determining eligibility. ACIR defines three types 
of property tax circuit—breakers based on coverage. These are (1) 'basic 
circuit—breakers which cover only elderly homeowners, (2) "expanded 
circuit—breakers which include elderly renters (based on a percentage of 
rent equivalent to property tax) along with elderly homeowners, and (3) 
"general" circuit-breakers which provide benefits to all overburdened 
households
To the extent that elderly homeowners have a high ratio of real 
property holdings to income, it may be argued that limiting coverage to the 
elderly will insure that only those most in need of relief receive it. But 
when one considers income tax and property tax exemptions already granted 
the elderly and costs encounterd by young households (particularly in the 
form of dependents), this argument is less convincing. Bendick, in a study
8/ ACIR, op. cit., p. 4.
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of Wisconsin's expanded circuit-breaker program, found that the proportion 
of program benefits that go to the poor is lower for a program limited to 
elderly families than for a general circuit-breaker program. Relief is 
targeted more efficiently in a general program primarily because younger
families of equal income to aged families are larger and therefore more 
9/likely to be poor.—
With respect to occupancy status, the justification on equity grounds 
for including renters is dependent upon whether renters pay property taxes. 
There is a current debate among economists about who pays the property tax 
—  the owners of capital (landlords in this case) or renters. If the
entire burden of property taxes is paid by owners of capital, then renters 
should be excluded. However, if renters pay property taxes in the form of 
higher rents, as is often believed in a rental market characterized by 
imperfect competition, then renters should also be covered. All but five 
states with property tax circuit-breakers include renters. It is usually 
assumed that 25 percent of the rent bill represents property taxes.
In choosing eligibility criteria, a trade-off between equity and cost 
must be made. Common sense dictates that, all else being equal, a program 
with broader coverage will be more expensive. Among the five states 
currently using general and broad—based circuit—breakers, greater expense 
is clearly evident on a per capita cost basis.
Precautionary Design Features. In designing circuit-breaker programs, 
it is often difficult to insure that benefits do not accrue to those not
9/ Marc Bendick, J r D e  signing Circuit-Breaker Property Relief, 
National Tax Journal, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (March 1974).
10/ The debate about property tax shifting is covered in section 4.
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actually in need of relief. A hypothetical case may serve as illustration. 
Few would argue that a wealthy family owning a high value home would merit 
relief under a property tax relief program. However, it is quite possible 
that property taxes on this large property holding, when compared to a 
manipulated "income," may exceed a given threshold and thus qualify the 
family for relief. If the circuit-breaker program uses taxable rather than 
unadjusted income from all sources, this family might qualify for a percen­
tage rebate of property taxes.
Several methods exist for dealing with and preventing such prac— 
11/tices.”  Perhaps the most important method is a comprehensive definition
of income• Bendickfs citation of the Wisconsin definition of income is
illustrative of what might be considered.
A recipient must have a husband-and-wife or single person 
"household income" of $7000 or less (household income 
includes Wisconsin-taxable income, plus net income earned 
out side the state, alimony and support payment s , cash 
public assistance, gross pension income including social 
security, nontaxable income from federal government 
securities, and workmen's compensation and unemployment 
insurance. Unlike most tax programs, but like welfare 
programs, joint filing is mandatory)
Bendick suggests that further control should be made to:
1) Adjust the measurement of household income to take account of 
family size;
2) Include intrafamily transfers as part of household income of 
family members not sharing a homestead;
3) Pool incomes of all related individuals in a homestead as house­
hold income (in addition to income of husbands and wives);
11/ Some protection is basic to formula design. Adjustments in the 
threshold may include a variable threshold (higher for higher 
incomes), coinsurance restrictions, and income ceilings.
12/ Bendick, op. cit■, p. 19.
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4) Add imputed rent for non-family members sharing a household;
5) Add a net worth ceiling for eligibility.
Some families may have large asset holdings (stocks, bonds, investment 
property, etc.) but low current income. They may qualify for circuit- 
breaker relief even though they are "wealthy." Three circuit-breaker 
states, Maryland, New York, and Utah, currently use some form of wealth 
ceilings to eliminate asset-rich families from eligibility. While a wealth 
ceiling would prevent property-rich families or families with other large 
asset holdings from claiming relief, serious problems arise in estimating 
wealth. Furthermore, as pointed out by ACIR, a wealth ceiling should not 
be so low as to force people to give up their homes in order to qualify for 
relief.
Finally, all existing circuit-breaker programs include a ceiling on 
maximum benefits. These ceilings represent a tradeoff between the desire 
to provide relief where due and the desire to prevent windfall benefits, 
particularly to owners of high-value property. Ceilings also limit the 
cost— in terms of foregone revenues— *to governments financing the circuit- 
breaker program.
Current Status of Circuit-Breaker Programs in the U.S.
Data in Table 1 give some idea of the combinations of coverage and re­
lief formulae used by the thirty-one states (including the District of Co-
13/lumbia) with property tax circuit-breaker programs.™' Information on 
costs and extent of benefits for these programs is presented as Appendix A.
As the data in Table 1 indicate, there is wide variation in designing 
circuit-breaker programs. This variation suggests the flexibility of the
13/ Shannon and Tippett (June 1978) op. cit., pp. 11-18
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circuit-breaker concept in meeting diverse financial, social and political 
situations.
Most state programs are limited to elderly persons, with five programs 
limited to elderly homeowners only, and seventeen programs covering both 
renters and homeowners who are elderly. Seven states have circuit-breakers 
that cover homeowners and renters regardless of age, although New York and 
Washington, D.C. accomplish this via differential programs for the elderly 
and non-elderly. Hawaii and Maryland have programs that cover all renters 
and all homeowners, respectively. All but four states have maximum income 
ceilings, and three states have wealth ceilings. Eighteen states use 
threshold formulae of some type, ten states use sliding scale formulae, and 
four states use special formulae more closely related to the sliding- 
scale.—  ^ Almost all of the circuit-breaker programs have been modified at 
least once since adoption.
In comparing costs and extent of benefits of these programs, it is 
clear that general coverage programs are more expensive than those which 
limit coverage to the elderly. Within the categories of elderly-only and 
general-coverage programs, it is difficult to generalize on patterns of 
costs and benefits. It does appear that limits on maximum credit and 
income ceilings generally constrain the effects of circuit-breakers sub­
stantially.
14/ This sums to 32 states (including Washington, D.C.) due to North 
Dakota's separate formulae for renters and homeowners.
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Elementals of the New York Circuit-Breaker Law
In March 1978, the New York State Legislature adopted a circuit- 
breaker program (sections 7 and 12 of S.8819-A.11636) as amendments to the 
tax law. This program was an amalgamation and compromise among separate 
circuit-breaker proposals by the three leading gubernatorial candidates 
Governor Carey, Senator Anderson, and Assemblyman Duryea. It consists of
both a real property tax circuit-breaker credit and a real property tax 
circuit—breaker deduction, which are mutually exclusive in application. 
Although the program is limited in terms of amount of relief granted, it 
covers both elderly (65 years and older) and non—elderly households. 
Elderly taxpayers can, however, qualify for substantially greater relief 
than non-elderly families.
Definitions. Under the New York circuit-breaker laws, a "household" 
is defined broadly to include the taxpayer and all who share the residence. 
Tenants not related to the taxpayer are excluded as household members. 
"Household gross income" is defined as adjusted gross income as reported 
for federal income tax purposes, plus excluded capital gains, earned income 
that is excludable for federal tax purposes, support money not included in 
adjusted gross income, nontaxable strike benef its, supplemental security 
income payments, exempt pensions and annuities (such as railroad retire­
ment, social security and veterans' disability), unemployment insurance 
payments, interest from state and local bonds, workmen's compensation, and 
cash public assistance and relief. It does not include medical assistance 
for the needy or in-kind relief such as surplus foods. A residence under 
the circuit-breaker means a dwelling and no more than one acre of property.
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Large landholdings, such as farms or estates, will not qualify for 
relief.” ^
"Qualifying real property taxes" are all real property taxes exclusive 
of penalties and interest levied on the residence of a qualified taxpayer. 
They include any property taxes that would have been levied in the absence 
of other partial exemptions. This means that taxpayers with partial 
exemptions such as the veterans* and elderly exemptions can use exempt 
taxes in computing total real property taxes; circuit-breaker relief will 
supplement, rather than replace, benefits received from current partial 
exemptions.
Qualified renters, as well as homeowners, are eligible for circuit- 
breaker relief. Under the law, 25 percent of rent is considered as the 
real property tax equivalent. The amount of rent paid is reduced to 
reflect utilities, furnishing or board that might be included in the rental 
figure.
Real Property Tax Circuit—Breaker Credit. By the provisions of 
subsection (e) of §606 of the Tax Law, a tax credit is available to all 
qualified taxpayers for the tax years 1978, 1979 , and 1980. Taxpayers 
qualifying for relief are elderly and non-elderly resident individuals who 
have occupied the same residence for at least six months and whose house­
hold gross incomes do not exceed $12,000. Taxpayers who would otherwise 
qualify are not eligible for circuit-breaker relief if the full value of 
the residence exceeds $65,000 or if the adjusted rent for the residence 
exceeds $300 per month. Relief is equal to 50 percent of property taxes
15/ §305 of the Agriculture and Markets Law provides for the agricultural
value assessment of farmland within agricultural districts.
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exceeding a variable percentage of household income, thus making this a 
threshold-type circuit-breaker with a coinsurance requirement.
An important feature of the real property tax circuit-breaker credit 
is that it uses different relief schedules for elderly and non-elderly 
households. Reflecting the general preference given to the elderly under 
circuit-breaker provisions in other states, the relief provided to the 
elderly is substantially greater than to the non-elderly by way of lower 
income percentages and higher maximum benefit ceilings.
For the non-elderly, excess real property taxes qualifying for a tax
credit are calculated as follows:
If household gross 
i n c om e for the 
taxable year is:
Not over $5,400 
$5,401 - $7,200 
$7,201 - $10,000 
$10,001 - $12,000
The amount of credit granted
Excess real property taxes 
are the excess of real 
property tax equivalent or 
the excess of qualifying 
real property taxes over:
5% of household gross income 
6% of household gross income 
6% of household gross income 
7% of household gross income
is drastically reduced by provisions
which limit maximum levels of reduction. The maximum credit cannot exceed
$20 if household gross income is $5,400 or less, $15 if income is between 
$5,400 and $7,200, $12.50 if income is between $7,200 and $10,000, and $10 
if income is more than $10,000 but does not exceed $12,000.
For the elderly (65 years and older), excess real property taxes 
qualifying for a tax credit are calculated as follows
16/ This schedule (stated in section 7 of S . 8819-A. 11636) was initially 
set to become effective in the tax year beginning in 1980. However, 
the implementation date was advanced by S.9095—A.12108 to the taxable 
years 1978, 1979, and 1980.
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Xf household gross 
i n c ome for the 
taxable year is:
Excess real property taxes 
are the excess of the real 
property tax equivalent or 
50% of the excess of quali­
fying real property taxes 
over:
Not over $3,600 
$3,601 - $5,400 
$5,401 - $7,200 
$7,201 - $12,000
4% of household gross income 
5% of household gross income 
6% of household gross income 
7% of household gross income
The maximum circuit-breaker credit for elderly households is $200 if 
income does not exceed $7,200, $40 if income is between $7,200 and $10,000, 
and $15 if income is greater than $10,000 and does not exceed $12,000.
The following tables (Table 2 and 3) provide illustrations of the 
magnitude of property tax relief granted under the New York real property 
tax circuit-breaker credit for non-elderly and elderly households. It is 
clear from these examples that the elderly will receive substantially 
greater relief than non-elderly taxpayers. This is primarily the result of 
the relatively liberal maximum credit ceiling of $200 for the elderly, as 
contrasted to $20 for the non-elderly.
Real Property Tax Circuit-Breaker Deduction. As an alternative to the 
circuit-breaker credit, 1978 legislation allows a property tax circuit- 
breaker deduction for state resident individual income tax computation^1^  
Under this legislation, a qualified taxpayer can deduct a specified amount 
of property taxes from federal adjusted gross income (for state income tax 
purposes) for taxable years 1978, 1979, and 1980. Taxpayers qualifying for 
relief are non-elderly resident individuals whose household gross incomes 
exceed $5,400 but do not exceed $12,000 and who have occupied the same 
residence for at least six months. Relief is not available under the real
17/ Tax Law §612, Subsection (m) as authorized under subsection (c), 
para. (18). This legislation may be changed from a modification to an 
adjustment status to facilitate its administration in conjunction with 
New York City tax.
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property tax circuit-breaker deduction to those filing for the real prop­
erty tax circuit-breaker credit. As in the case of the tax credit, tax­
payers who would otherwise qualify are not eligible for circuit-breaker 
relief if the full value of the residence exceeds $65,000 or if adjusted
rent for the residence exceeds $300 per month.
Excess property taxes and the amount of deduction which can be claimed
under the circuit-breaker deduction are determined as follows:
And the real property tax Then the follow- 
If household gross income equivalent or qualifying ing deduction
for the taxable year is: real property taxes exceed: is allowed:______
Over $5,400 but not
over $7,200 6% of household gross income $450
Over $7,200 but not
over $10,000 6% of household gross income $300
Over $10,000 but not
over $12,000 7% of household gross income $250
Table 4 provides an illustration of the amount of relief households of
various income levels may expect to receive (assuming household gross
income equals New York taxable income).
Table 4. Amount of Relief for Households of Various Income Levels After*n<Deductions
Income
Property
tax
threshold
Deduction
allowed
State income 
tax before 
deduction
State income 
tax after 
deduction
Actual
relief
$ 6,300 Over $378 or 6% $450 $225 202.50 $22.50
7,200 Over $432 or 6% 450 272 247.50 24.50
8,100 Over $486 or 6% 300 326 308 18
9,000 Over $540 or 6% 300 380 362 18
9,900 Over $594 or 6% 300 443 422 21
10,800 Over $756 or 7% 250 506 488.50 17.50
State individual income taxes owed are calculated from rates set under 
section 4 of the 1978 budget bill (S.8819-A.11636).
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By comparing relief provided under the property tax credit (Table 2) 
and the property tax deduction (Table 4), it is apparent that greater 
benefits are afforded by non-elderly households by the deduction* In all 
cases, the benefits from the deduction for a qualified household exceed the 
ceiling benefits from the tax credit. However, actual relief available to 
the non-elderly under either the circuit-breaker credit or the circuit- 
breaker deduction is limited.
Summary. Adoption of circuit-breaker legislation indicates an inter­
est in New York State to "do something" about the real property tax. It is 
also clear from the low benefit levels available to the non-elderly that 
legislators are hesitant to provide property tax relief that would place a 
large burden on the state individual income tax. Given; the fiscal real­
ities and uncertainties facing the State of New York, this limited response 
is not surprising. If the experiences of other circuit-breaker states 
suggest precedence, it is likely that coverage and extent of relief will be 
expanded in the future. History suggests that it is much more difficult to 
initiate reform or relief programs than it is to extend coverage under 
existing legislation. As will be suggested in the concluding section, 
careful consideration of alternatives and their impact should be given 
before the New York circuit-breaker program is substantially expanded.
- 21 -
Circuit-Breakers and the Property Tax:
Some Policy Issues
According to public opinion polls, the property tax is considered the 
most onerous tax. In a June 1978 poll conducted by The New York Times and 
CBS News over the United States, the property tax was cited by 27 percent 
as the most "unfair,” and the Federal income tax was identified similarly
by 21 percent.— ^
Shannon cites several unique characteristics of the property tax which
19 /lead to its unpopularity:—
—  The property tax is considered to fall heavily on low-income house­
holds and often bears little relationship to household cash flow.
—  It is viewed as anti-housing; housing is a sacred right of the 
American dream.
—  Unlike income or sales taxes, property taxes impose a levy on 
unrealized capital gains.
—  The property tax is by far the most difficult to administer. 
Infrequent mass reappraisals result in pronounced taxpayer shocks.
—  The property tax is usually paid once a year, particularly for 
taxpayers who do not escrow their property taxes. This is a more 
painful and visible method of payment than the "pay as you go" 
income and sales taxes.
—  The property tax is often the whipping boy in pronouncements by
18/ The New York Times, June 28, p. A16.
19/ John Shannon, "The Property Tax: Reform of Relief?" in Property Tax
Reform, George E. Peterson (ed.), Washington, D.C.: The John C.
Lincoln Institute and the Urban Institute, 1973.
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political leaders and tax scholars. This adverse publicity has 
given the property tax a poor public image*.
Despite its poor public image, the property tax has many virtues. 
Perhaps the most important is that the property tax is the major source of 
locally-raised revenue for local governments. Any move away from the 
property tax would likely result in a decrease in local fiscal autonomy. 
The property tax is also a relatively stable and predictable revenue source 
for local governments, an important characteristic in times of rapid 
fluctuations in economic conditions.
The inescapable element of fiscal realism is that the property tax is 
an important producer of revenues for local governments. In FY 1977, the 
real property tax generated approximately $8*5 billion for New York’s local 
governments. During the same year, personal income taxes produced about $5 
billion and sales and use taxes amounted to $4 billion for New York’s state 
and local governments. It is therefore uniikely that a ready substitute 
for the property tax will be found. Prudent public policy would dictate 
that measures be adopted to reduce some of the most important deficiencies 
of the property tax.
The most pervasive and consistent criticism of the property tax is 
that it is accused of being regressive —  that it falls disproportionately 
on low-income households* This regressivity argument has been a major 
reason for advocating circuit-breaker programs* Although public and 
political opinion seems to hold this notion of regressivity almost 
unanimously, there is considerable debate —— both theoretical and empirical 
—  on this issue. The value of adopting circuit-breakers hinges crucially 
on this issue of regressivity.
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Is the Property Tax Regressive? There are basically two views on the 
incidence of property taxes. The traditional view considers the property 
tax as a kind of excise tax which is borne by the users rather than owners 
of property. Under the traditional reasoning, the property tax is paid by 
renters through higher rents, homeowners through direct billing, and 
consumers through higher prices on commodities and services produced with 
taxes on residential property.
Estimates of property tax burdens by income class based on the
traditional theory invariably conclude that the property tax is regress-
20 /ive.—  An example of such an exercise is presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Real Estate Taxes as a Percentage of Family Income for Elderly 
and Non-Elderly Single-Family Homeowners, 1970
Family
Income
Real estate taxes as a percent of family income
Elderly
(age 65 and over)
Non-elderly 
(under 65)
Less than $2,000 15.8 18.9
$2,000 - 2,999 9.5 10.1
$3,000 - 3,999 8.0 7.2
$4,000 - 4,999 7.3 5.5
$5,000 - 5,999 6.2 5.1
$6,000 - 6,999 5.8 4.3
$7,000 - 9,999 4.8 4.1
$10,000 - 14,999 3.9 3.7
$15,000 - 24,999 3.3 3.3
$25,000 or more 2.7 2.9
All incomes 8.1 4.1
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Property Tax
Circuit—Breakers: Current Status and Policy Issues, Washington, D.C.,
February 1975, p. 15.
20/ For examples of the traditional tax view, see Dick Netzer, Economics 
of the Property Tax, Washington, D . C . : The Brookings Institution,
1966 or Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Financing 
Schools and Property Tax Relief —  A State Responsibility, Washington, 
D.C., January 1973.
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Data in Table 5 indicate that, under the traditional assumptions of 
incidence, residential property tax payments are regressive in relation to 
current income* For families with less than $2,000 annual income, resi­
dential property taxes represent almost 19 percent of income. This percen­
tage declines consistently as income rises; for families with incomes 
greater than $25,000, residential property taxes require less than 3 
percent of income.
Proponents of circuit breakers cite several reasons for their belief
21/that residential property taxes are regressive.—  First, low-income
families spend a greater proportion of current family income on housing. 
A flat-rate tax on housing such as the property tax would therefore be re­
gressive. Second, assessment variations may contribute to regressivity if 
high-value properties are under-assessed relative to low-cost housing. In 
a recent study of the City of Boston, Black attempted to account for the
impact of widespread intrajurisdictional assessment bias in favor of high-
22/valued properties.—  He found that assessment bias is significant and
that the property tax, as administered in Boston, is regressive. Third, 
the property tax may be regressive among jurisdictions as well as among 
taxpayers. A low-income and low-wealth jurisdiction will have to levy 
higher rates of property taxation for similar levels of public services 
than will a higher-income jurisdiction with higher-valued residences. 
Fourth, an element of regressivity in practice comes from the Federal
21/ Ibid.
22/ David E. Black, "Property Tax Incidence: The Excise-Tax Effect and
Assessment Practices," National Tax Journal, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (December 
1977).
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personal income tax deductibility of property tax payments.—  Homeowners
who can deduct are generally richer than renters who cannot. Lower—income 
homeowners are far more likely to use the standard deduction rather than 
itemizing and therefore are unable to take advantage of the property tax 
deduction. This tax deduction is also more important for higher— income 
groups, since the value of the deduction increases with the marginal income 
tax rate.
The second view on the incidence of property taxes —  the revision­
ist" school —  challenges the basic assumptions on incidence which underpin 
the traditional approach. Revisionists argue that the property tax is a 
tax on capital and is borne by the owners, rather than users, of capital. 
Since ownership of capital is highly concentrated in high—income groups, 
the revisionist view claims that the property tax is progressive. Revis­
ionists therefore see little rationale for granting relief to renters or 
owners, particularly in the form of circuit—breakers.
The theoretical basis for the revisionist view was provided by 
Mieszkowski, who employed a general equilibrium model to show that under 
certain conditions the average tax on all property will not produce an
excise—tax effect on consumers but will be borne instead by all owners of
24/capital through a decrease in the average rate of return on capital.  ^1 In
ncf 26/separate empirical studies, Henry Aaron,—  George Peterson,—  and Mason
23/ Dick Netzer, "The Incidence of the Property Tax Revisited," National 
~  Tax Journal, Vol. XXXI, No. 4 (December 1976).
24/ Peter Mieszkowski, "The Property Tax: An Excise Tax or a Profits
Tax?", Journal of Political Economy, April 1972.
25/ Henry J. Aaron, Who Pays the Property Tax? A New View, Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.
26/ George Peterson, "The Regressivity of the Residential Property Tax, 
Urban Institute Working Paper 1207-10, November 1972.
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Gaffney—  have found that residential property taxes are at worst 
"slightly regressive" and at best* "progressive,"
A corollary to the revisionist theory of incidence is that property 
tax burdens should be measured against permanent or life-cycle income 
rather than current or annual income, The basic notion is that many of 
the poor in any one year are either those who are retired and previously 
had higher incomes or those who are young and expect to have higher income 
in the future. For both these groups, it is argued that housing consump­
tion is based on life-cycle income —  that is, housing decisions are based 
in part on where one has been or where one is going, not just on where one 
is. Many argue that the property tax over a lifetime is much less regress­
ive (perhaps even progressive) than current taxes related to current 
income. A large proportion of property tax relief such as circuit-breakers 
would therefore go to individuals who need it least —  those with large 
asset holdings. If the property tax is indeed progressive relative to per­
manent income, tax relief on the basis of current income may be undesir­
able. Gaffney takes this one step further by asserting that many taxpayers
no j
have low inocme but command considerable assets.—  . In lower brackets of 
income, most income comes from labor; in higher brackets most comes from 
property and assets.
The counter argument to life-cycle analyses is that policymakers are, 
and should be, most concerned with current tax burdens relative to current 
income. Is the policymaker to tell younger families that the future will
27 /
27/ Mason Gaffney, "The Property Tax is a Progressive Tax," Proceedings of
the 64th Annual Conference on Taxation, National Tax Association, _____
28/ Mason Gaffney, "An Agenda for Strengthening the Property Tax," in 
Property Tax Reform, op, cit.
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be better and elderly that had they been more frugal their taxes would be 
no problem? Moreover, proponents of circuit-breakers argue that the entire 
tax system in the United States is generally based on current income and 
there is little logic in singling out circuit-breakers as violating the 
doctrine of permanent income.
The issue of property tax regressivity is crucial in determining the 
desirability of adopting a circuit-breaker program. There is little con­
census on the issue; the argument is fraught with conceptual and empirical 
difficulties. Despite this academic irresolution, policymakers appear to 
agree that the property tax is indeed regressive. The strength of this 
consensus is indicated by the fact that every state now has some form of 
property tax relief for elderly households. It would appear prudent for 
policymakers to examine the situation in their individual states carefully 
—  including the impact of present assessment practices —  ^before adopting 
circuit—breaker legislation. Such analysis would also be useful in 
designing a program that addresses the particular characteristics of a 
state*s tax system.
Is the Property Tax a "Bad'' Tax? An almost universal justification —  
often an implicit one —  for circuit—breakers is a feeling that any de­
crease in reliance on the property tax is in the public interest. Much has 
been written on the purported evils of the property tax. A comprehensive 
analysis of the relative merits of the property tax is beyond the scope of 
this discussion. It is appropriate, however, to evaluate the property tax 
according to various public finance criteria and to discuss the potential 
circuit-breakers offer in addressing concerns about the property tax.
A concise and objective definition of "fairness" or "goodness" in 
taxation does not exist. From the individual perspective, the best tax is
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one that somebody else pays. It is hardly surprising to find differences 
of opinion about what constitutes a fair and good tax system; any discuss­
ion of what is wrong with the property tax and how it might be improved 
must recognize these different perspectives.
Equity. Probably the most important question about the property tax 
is if it is "equitable" or does it lead to everyone paying his or her "fair 
share." There are two principal approaches in defining an equitable tax 
base.—  ^ One is that taxes should be related to ability to pay. The other 
is that taxes should be related to the level of benefits received from 
public services. Neither approach is easy to apply, and both are difficult 
to define in a practical sense.
In earlier times, an individuals property ownership may have been a 
reasonable measure of ability to pay. It is now generally agreed that 
ownership of property is a poor measure of ability. This is primarily 
because the only property subject to taxation in most states (including New 
York) is real estate —  land and improvements. The property tax is not a 
general tax on wealth; it taxes only real property. Real estate is an 
important component of asset-holdings, but wealth is often held in other 
forms. The real property tax, as presently constituted, discriminates
29/ A third concept of equity in taxation involves distribution of the tax 
burden after a tax base has been established. Horizontal equity—  
"equals treated equally"— requires that individuals in similar eco­
nomic situations pay the same tax. For real property taxes, this 
would require that property owners holding real estate of similar 
value be treated equally. As the report of Governor Hugh L. Carey 
(cited in the final section of this paper) indicates, assessment prac­
tices in New York State have led to wide variation in assessment/mar- 
ket value ratios, both within and among different property classes. 
Assuming that full market value represents an equitable basis for 
assessment, the real property tax as administered in many New York 
assessing units does not appear to meet the criterion of horizontal 
equity.
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against those who rely on real estate as opposed to other types of capital 
and assets. This concern may be particularly important for groups such as 
farmers who depend heavily on real estate investment to generate family 
income. It is also asserted that ownership of property is a poor measure 
of ability to pay when measured against current family income (from which 
property taxes must be paid).
For public services that are property-related and enhance the value of 
property (such as roads, sewerage and water facilities, fire protection, 
etc.), the property tax may be related closely to benefits available to 
property owners. Taxes paid on property may, however, bear little corres­
pondence to consumption of many local public services. High-value or land- 
extensive properties may not benefit much from services. This is parti" 
cularly true for services which principally benefit people, not property 
(schools, public assistance, etc.)®
It is probably safe to conclude that the real property tax cannot be 
judged very highly by either criteria of equity —  ability to pay or bene­
fits received. A circuit-breaker program is unlikely to improve signifi­
cantly the relationship between property taxes and benefits received. If 
one accepts the notion that current annual family income is a reasonable 
measure of ability to pay, a circuit-breaker program could help tie prop­
erty taxes more closely to ability to pay. Under current programs, this 
will be true only for low-income families, perhaps only the elderly. A 
potentially deleterious effect of circuit—breakers is that they may reduce 
tax liability for others who are property-rich but income-poor.
Neutrality. In a basically free-market economy, most people feel that 
a tax should not interfere with, or distort, private economic decisions. A 
tax is considered to be neutral if it does not lead to private resource
-30-
misallocation and economic inefficiencies. An example of a neutral tax is
a head or poll tax, which does not depend on the level of economic activity
30/and therefore will not alter business or household behavior.—
Property taxes may affect economic activity in several ways. In 
discussing the efficiency impacts of property taxes, it is necessary to 
distinguish between taxes on land and taxes on capital improvements. Since 
the supply of land is virtually fixed, a tax on land will have little 
effect on the supply of land. Landowners will bear the burden of a land 
tax, and their after-tax income will be reduced by the amount of the tax.
As Gaffney points out, there are two kinds of effects that a tax on 
land exerts.^'' The first is the marginal effect, A land tax is borne by 
landowners, and will be capitalized into lower land prices. If land is 
being put to its most profitable use, a land tax will not affect decisions 
on how to use the land. A tax on land will not change the use of land, and 
therefore exerts no "marginal" effect on economic decision-making. The 
second effect of a land tax is on the landowner's wealth. A landowner must 
pay land taxes and after-tax income is reduced. If land is not being used 
in the most profitable manner, an increase in land taxes may provide in­
centive for more intensive land use. Increased land taxes make speculative 
holding of land more expensive.
Property taxes on capital improvements —  particularly buildings —  
are not neutral. The supply of capital improvements, at least in the long
30/ A head tax is a classic illustration of conflict between criteria for 
evaluating taxes. A head tax is efficient and neutral in terms of 
resource allocation, but is generally considered inequitable because 
it is highly regressive in incidence.
31/ Mason Gaffney, "An Agenda for Strengthening the Property Tax," in 
Property Tax Reform, op. cit.
-31-
run, is not fixed. An increase in taxes on capital improvements will lead 
to a decrease in after-tax income to owners. Investors can divert capital 
to other uses, which will eventually reduce the supply of capital improve­
ments. Decisions between taxed and non-taxed (or lower-taxed) investments 
are affected on the margin. Since levels of property taxation vary among 
jurisdictions, property taxes may alter locational decisions of businesses 
and households.
It is often asserted that taxing buildings slows down renewal and 
replacement of obsolete buildings. Conversely, taxing land encourages an 
owner to improve the use of the land or sell. These differential economic 
effects on land and buildings have led many tax theorists to advocate 
shifting away from property taxes on buildings and towards land (site 
value) taxes. Nationwide, land is generally considered to be underassessed 
relative to b u i l d i n g s M o d e r n - d a y  followers of the Georgist land tax 
concept —  such as Mason Gaffney, Lowell Harris and Dick Netzer argue 
that many of the negative economic effects of property taxes would be 
eliminated if the prevailing under—assessment of land were ended. They 
also take the argument one step further by advocating that the property tax 
should be shifted to a land tax.
Economic neutrality of the property tax —  or its non-neutrality —  is 
not likely to be affected significantly by tax relief provided by circuit- 
breakers. A minor salutary effect might be an income effect for property 
owners. Reduction in property tax liability might allow low-income 
homeowners to make improvements on their property that they otherwise might 
not have been able to afford. A circuit-breaker may also decrease the
32/ Ibid.
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disincentives for a property owner to invest in capital improvements, since 
the threat of increased property taxes would be decreased or eliminated. 
If policy objectives are to offset the investment disincentives of property 
taxes, a direct property tax abatement program that provides partial or 
complete exemption of new capital investment from increased property taxes 
would undoubtedly be more effective than a circuit-breaker approach. Many 
states, including New York, have adopted such a program, generally for 
commercial and industrial properties. A potential detrimental economic 
impact of a circuit-breaker is a reduction in the cost of holding land in a 
nonproductive fashion. This would be important for land-owning groups that 
have low incomes but may be wealthy in terms of assets, such as a retired 
family with low current income living in a high value home.
Circuit-Breakers: Reform or Relief? It is clear that the real 
property tax, as currently conceived and administered, is far from perfect. 
A basic issue should be faced by policymakers: do circuit-breakers 
represent true property ^ tax reform, or are they merely another band-aid 
relief program for a politically vocal constituency?
Proponents of the circuit-breaker concept readily admit that it is a 
second-best alternative. A circuit-breaker does not address the funda­
mental problems of the property tax, such as distortion of land use, fiscal 
disparities among localities, and inconsistent administrative and assess­
ment procedures. Circuit-breakers can provide relief for one of the most 
serious symptoms of the property tax -- excessive burden in relation to 
current income for particular groups of families and individuals. If one 
believes that the incidence of the property tax is indeed regressive, 
circuit-breakers can eliminate some of the more onerous aspects of tax 
inequity. The circuit-breaker is not wholesale tax reform; it addresses
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effects rather than causes. An important alternative to circuit—breakers 
which policymakers should consider is a major overhaul of the present 
system, most notably assessment improvement.
Who Pays? There are several potential impacts of circuit-breakers 
that should be scrutinized carefully. The property tax, and modifications 
such as the circuit—breaker, must be viewed in the context of the total tax 
system. As mentioned earlier, circuit—breakers do not reduce taxes; they 
merely redirect the burden to other taxpayers. In this sense, there is no 
"cost" to society of circuit-breakers. The "cost," in reality, is redis­
tribution of the tax burden. Genuine tax relief requires tax reduction, 
which can be achieved only by reducing the overall level of government 
services or making the provision of the services more efficient.
Circuit—breakers shift tax liability among taxpayers and tax bases. 
Desirability of circuit—breakers should be judged, in part, on the direc­
tion and magnitude of the redistribution. Circuit—breakers can be designed 
to provide property tax relief by increasing the take from personal or 
business income taxes, sales taxes, or property taxpayers who do not qual­
ify for circuit—breaker reductions. It is important to remember that there 
is no "perfect" tax —  all have limitations and weaknesses. Altering tax 
liability through property tax circuit-breakers may result in increased 
reliance on another tax that has even less desirable economic and equity 
impacts.
If circuit-breakers are financed by personal income taxes (as is done 
in most states, including New York), equity implications will depend 
largely on the design of the state’s income tax structure. A relatively 
progressive state income structure will result in a potentially progressive 
transfer of tax burden for low—income property taxpayers to wealthier
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income—taxpayers • If the state income tax is regressive with respect to 
income, circuit-breaker relief funded through the personal income tax will 
be regressive* New York's personal income tax is one of the most progress­
ive in the nation, although 1978 legislation will reduce this progressivity 
somewhat.
The personal income tax is often considered to be the most desirable
tax available. In reality, the applause accorded the personal income tax
is somewhat undeserved. Economists have long observed that exemptions,
deductions, and special provisions have eroded the federal tax base and
thus increased the rates needed for the income tax to raise a given amount 
33/of revenue.—  Since many states, including New York, base their personal 
income tax on the federal structure, the same erosion occurs at the state 
level. Capital gains and investment income provisions, homeowner prefer­
ences, tax-free municipal bonds, liberal depreciation and investment tax 
credits, and numerous other "loopholes" allow high-income and high-wealth 
individuals to reduce their effective tax rates substantially. Erosion of 
the income tax base means that the personal income tax is primarily a pay­
roll tax that is borne largely by wage earners who cannot take advantage of 
special provisions accorded non-wage income. Payroll taxes for Old Age, 
Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance (OASDHI), which are regressive 
in relation to income, compound the fact that wage earners are highly taxed 
relative to individuals who derive their income from property and capital 
investments.
33/ John L. Palmer and Joseph J. Minerik, "Income Security Policy," in 
Setting National Budget Priorities: The Next Ten Years, Henry Owen
and Charles L, Schultze (eds.), Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1976.
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Circuit-breaker property tax relief funded by personal income taxes will 
shift tax burdens from individuals who hold wealth in the form of real 
estate to income earners, From an equity viewpoint, this transfer of tax 
liability would be more desirable if reforms in personal income tax laws 
were effected. Broadening the income tax base by eliminating preferential 
treatment accorded non-wage income would allow circuit-breakers, when 
funded through increased income taxes, to be more equitable and progress­
ive.
Some states, excluding New York, have funded their circuit—breaker 
programs by increasing sales taxes. Sales taxes are generally assumed to 
be shifted forward to consumers. Since low—income families tend to consume 
a high proportion of their income, low—income families usually pay a 
relatively high proportion of their income in sales taxes. Although exemp­
tion of food reduces sales tax regressivity, it is usually considered to be 
proportional or regressive in incidence. In this context, property tax 
relief can be considered sales tax aggravation. Funding circuit—breakers 
through increased sales tax does not appear to be a desirable alternative.
General vs. Specific Coverage. Another important equity consideration 
involves the scope of coverage for circuit-breaker eligibility. Twenty- 
four of the 31 states with circuit-breaker programs limit eligibility to 
elderly or disabled homeowners or renters. If the justification for cir­
cuit-breakers is to limit excess burden of property taxes, all low-income 
families should be eligible for relief. On the basis of equity, general 
rather than specific coverage is desirable. New York’s circuit-breaker
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program covers both elderly and non-elderly but the extent of relief 
provided the latter group is limited.
Obviously, a general coverage circuit-breaker program will be more 
expensive than one that applies only to specific groups. This is an 
important trade-off between equity and cost that must be faced in designing 
property tax relief programs.
Reduce Exemptions? Perhaps the most desirable method of financing 
circuit-breakers is reduction or elimination of many of the exemptions 
currently offered property owners. In New York State, a wide variety of 
kinds of real estate held by various kinds of individuals and private 
organizations for various purposes are partially or entirely exempt from 
property taxation. For example, property of war veterans and certain near 
relatives is entitled to exemption of up to $5,000 of assessed value, if 
purchased with "eligible funds," pensions and other sources provided by the 
federal or New York governments, as defined in the Real Property Tax Law. 
Persons over 65 years of age with limited incomes may be eligible for 
partial tax exemption on their homes. Since some exemptions (such as the 
veteran*s exemption) are based on fixed dollar amounts rather than percen­
tage of value of the property (such as the elderly exemption), effective 
tax exemptions can often be substantial.
The basic problem of exemptions is that they are very crude and are 
not easily targeted to meet policy objectives. All veterans are not poor; 
neither are all senior citizens. Extent of application and effectiveness 
of exemptions vary widely among jurisdictions. Even though they are the 
result of State legislation and policies, most exemptions are financed by 
reduction in local tax revenues. Wholesale replacement of certain exemp­
tions with circuit-breaker relief could be more equitable and efficient in
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achieving the goals of reducing excessive property tax burdens for low- 
income families and distributing the costs of State policies more evenly.
Indirect Effects. Circuit-breakers may exert several indirect or 
"second-order" effects. One that is sometimes cited by circuit-breaker 
opponents is that property tax relief funded by the state will further 
erode the tenuous link between revenue-raising responsibility and authority 
over resource allocation. The separation of decisions on how to raise tax 
money and how to spend it is said to be irresponsible and to encourage 
freer spending by the local government that receives the politically 
"cost-free" revenue. This charge stems from what might be called a "pain- 
pleasure" thesis of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The pleasure of 
spending public monies should be linked with the pain of raising the same 
revenues.
The separation of tax and expenditure sources will be a more important
consideration if the circuit-breaker is general rather than specific in
application. A specific circuit-breaker may, however, encourage citizens
and their representatives in areas with high concentrations of eligible
citizens (for example, a jurisdiction with a high proportion of senior
citizens) to provide a higher level of public service than they would
otherwise. Aaron suggests that circuit-breakers may well change attitudes
34/of the aged toward school financing.—  As mentioned earlier, a sliding-
scale circuit-breaker or coinsurance requirements tend to diminish this 
effect, since eligible taxpayers still share a portion of any increase in 
property taxes. It is also true that the New York circuit-breaker program
34/ Henry Aaron, "What Do Circuit-Breaker Laws Accomplish?
op. cit.
in Peterson,
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is a post-property tax payment deduction on personal income tax liability. 
Local government officials will continue to face taxpayers when establish­
ing tax rates, which may be of primary concern to local citizens (even if 
effective tax liability is reduced by the circuit-breaker).
If circuit—breakers apply generally to all low—income groups, in­
creased demand for local services may present significant fiscal pressures 
on state governments. This would probably result in increased state 
surveillance and scrutiny of local fiscal affairs.
Delay True Reform? Perhaps the most consistent criticism of the 
property tax is that it places heavy burdens on low-income families. 
Circuit—breakers address this concern directly by linking annual income to 
tax payments. Circuit—breaker laws can alleviate regressivity of property 
taxes. If this is the primary and paramount defect of the property tax, 
circuit-breakers represent true tax reform.
Regressivity among individual taxpayers may, however, be only one 
aspect of the property tax that deserves scrutiny. Other problems with the 
property tax, such as land use distortion, interjurisdictional fiscal 
disparities, and poor assessment practices deserve careful consideration* 
If the property tax is viewed in the context of the overall tax system, 
circuit—breakers address only one of a myriad of needs for reform. 
Circuit—breakers, by eliminating the most visible defect, may make a bad 
system bearable and preclude major reforms that are required. Conversely, 
it can be argued that drastic changes are not feasible and incremental 
alteration in the proper direction are the best that can be achieved• 
Careful consideration of tax reform should not, however, be usurped by 
adoption of tax relief schemes such as the circuit-breaker.
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Circuit-Breakers in the New York Setting
New York State's public sector faces many pressing financial issues. 
Per capita state and local taxes are among the highest in the nation. 
Economic stagnation has increased demands for public services without 
concomitant expansion of tax revenues. Extreme interlocal variations in 
financial abilities exist, particularly among school districts. Adminis­
tration of the real property tax faces necessary and imminent overhaul to 
meet recent judicial rulings and notions of social equity.
A thorough discussion of the fiscal problems facing New York's state 
and local governments would stray from the central purpose of this paper. 
To place the discussion of circuit-breaker laws in proper perspective, it 
is necessary to outline the present financial environment of New York local 
governments, particularly with respect to property taxes.
Exemptions. Circuit-breakers can be viewed cynically as merely 
another property tax exemption. As mentioned previously, a wide variety of 
types of property held by various individuals and organizations for many 
purposes is currently eligible for partial or full exemption from property 
taxes. The question of exemptions in New York State has long been studied. 
In 1922 and 1927, the Special Joint Committee on Taxation and Retrenchment 
issued reports on real property tax exemptions. The Temporary State 
Commission on Revision of the Tax Laws recommended in 1935 that laws 
pertaining to real property tax exemptions be modified. Similar reports on 
exemptions were issued by the Constitutional Commission and Constitutional 
Convention staffs of 1938, 1959, and 1967. In 1969, the Joint Legislative 
Committee to Study and Investigate Real Property Tax Exemptions was 
established and presented its final report in 1970. The Temporary State 
Commission on State and Local Finances (the Feeney Commission) examined,
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among other matters, exemptions. Finally, the Temporary State Commission 
on the Real Property Tax was created in 1977 and was charged specifically 
with examining exemptions and many other aspects of the real property tax.
Despite these studies and public concerns, real property tax exemp­
tions have steadily increased in both number and value. For the 1967
assessment rolls, approximately 30 percent of total valuation in New York
35/State was exempt from real property taxes.—  Property held by federal,
state and local governments, particularly cities, accounted for the bulk of 
these exempt properties. Privately-owned exempt properties were education, 
religious, hospital and medical facilities, veterans and aged, and housing 
and urban renewal projects.
As the number and coverage of exemptions increase, property taxes are 
shifted to taxpayers who do not qualify for exemptions. Although exemp­
tions are often legislated by the State, most are financed by redistribut­
ing local tax burdens among residents. If exemptions are designed to 
implement statewide social policy, it would probably be preferable to 
finance such schemes through State revenues rather than local property 
taxes.
A major problem with current exemptions is the administrative burden 
that is placed on local assessors. For example, an application for 
veteran's exemption must be reviewed by the assessor to determine the 
existence of eligible funds, the source and preservation of such money, and 
the amount which may be applied as an exemption from assessed value. Any 
time spent processing and reviewing applications for partial exemptions
35/ Temporary State Commission on State and Local Finances, The Real Prop­
erty Tax (vol. 2), Albany: 1975, p, 88. Data cited are admittedly
imprecise (see Commission Report, pp. 90-91), but they offer some 
general indication of the magnitude of exemptions.
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distracts the assessor from performing his or her principal function —  to 
determine the value of property in the assessing jurisdiction. Exemptions 
for senior citizens pose particularly difficult administrative questions. 
Under current State law, elderly homeowners are eligible for a 50 percent 
reduction in the taxable assessed value of their property. Each municipal 
corporation (county, city, town, village and school district) within which 
the qualified owner resides has the option of granting the exemption. The 
individual municipalities also may establish their own income limitation 
within state-prescribed standards. Maximum permissable income is currently 
$7,200. It is possible for a property that is located in a village to have 
four different income limitations, or that property might be qualified for 
exemption in one or more, but perhaps not all municipal corporations. The 
responsibility for establishing and administering each exemption rests with 
the assessor. The New York. State circuit-breaker is a supplement to cur­
rent homeowner exemptions available to senior citizens, veterans, and 
others. This pyramiding will undoubtedly complicate administration.
Complete replacement of many current exemptions by a circuit-breaker 
has several merits. First, it would shift the financing of the tax relief 
from the local tax base to the State income tax. Distributing the burden 
of tax reduction across the State would reduce inequities among juris­
dictions and would provide relief for owners of non-exempt properties in 
areas with high concentrations of exempt properties. Second, local admin­
istration can be minimized; the State income tax agency can compute and 
certify income, which is one of the most difficult requirements for assess­
ors under the current exemption law. Third, a circuit-breaker can be de­
signed to provide effective and specific relief for the target group. For 
example, current exemptions of 50 percent of assessed value for eligible
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elder ly taxpayers may bear little relation to "excess burdens." The 
remaining 50 percent of tax liability may represent a significant hardship 
for some low-income families. For other homeowners, the 50 percent 
reduction in assessed value may provide excessive tax relief. Exemptions 
are a crude tool for implementing social policy. Circuit-breakers can be 
honed to insure that intended beneficiaries, and only the intended 
beneficiaries, obtain the desired relief.
O £ /
Assessment Reform.—  The New York State Real Property Tax Law 
(Section 306) requires that property be assessed at its full value. A 
common concept of full value in court decisions is market value. In 
practice, no New York assessing jurisdiction assesses all properties 
precisely at full value. In very few does even the average level of 
assessment approximate the full value statutory standard.
The Governors Advisory Panel of Consultants reported in 1976 on an 
analysis of a sample of residential properties drawn from the 197 3 state 
equalization survey.— ' The average ratio of assessment to sales was 
calculated, and then the average deviation of the assessment-to-sales ratio 
of each property from the sample average was determined (the coefficient of 
variation). In only 68 of 991 towns and cities in the state (excluding New 
York City) was the average deviation within 20 percent of the average 
assessment-sales ratio for that municipality. The average deviation was 
over 60 percent in 91 cities and towns. Said the panel, "[In] all but a
36/ Portions of the discussion on assessment practices were taken from 
Bert Mason and Edward Lutz, Real Property Tax Assessments in New York: 
A Primer, New York State College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, 
Information Bulletin 130 (October 1977).
37/ Governor Hugh L. Carey, Educational Finance and the New York State 
Real Property Tax —  The Inescapable Relationship, May 1976, Education 
Study Unit, N.Y. State Division of the Budget, State Capitol, Albany, 
New York 12224, 32 pp.
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handful of assessing units in New York State, assessments of residential
property are scattered with appalling randomness over a wide range of
3 8/deviation from the simple mean."—  This comment was inspired not simply 
by the failure to assess residences at full value, but by the failure to 
assess with reasonable consistency at any ratio of full value.
In this situation of "appalling randomness" of assessment of 
individual properties, and declining equalization rates in a rising real 
estate market, the New York Court of Appeals, the highest state court, 
decided that the New York Real Property Tax Law requires assessment at full 
(market) value. On June 5, 1975, the court ordered that the Town of Islip 
in Suffolk County assess all real property within the Town at full value by 
December 31, 1976 (a deadline that was later delayed).—  Although the 
Hellerstein decision was directed only to the Town of Islip, it binds the 
lower courts to uphold a similar challenge in any other assessing district. 
Many assessing jurisdictions across the State now face "Hellerstein-type" 
actions and many more court actions will undoubtedly be filed in the 
future.
These developments are stimulating widespread interest in bringing 
assessments to full value and maintaining them from year to year at that 
changing level. These are difficult goals not attained statewide over the 
nearly 200 years that the state law has required assessment at full value 
or its equivalent.
Full value assessment (or for that matter, consistent assessment at a 
percentage of full value) would cause a shift of taxes among individual
33/ Governor Hugh L. Carey, op. cit. , p. 7.
39/ Hellerstein v. Assessor of Town of Islip, 1975, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 371 
N.Y,S»2d 388, 386 N.Y.S.2d 406, 352 N.E.2nd 593.
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properties and among different classes of property. This is an inevitable 
outcome of equalizing assessments of properties having equal full or market 
value. The studies done for the governor's panel (cited above) by the 
State Board of Equalization and Assessment and the Education Unit of. the 
State Division of the Budget indicate that the shifts in taxes within the 
residential property class from one property to another would total far 
more than the shift from other property classes to the residential cate­
gory.—  ^ Among classes, however, estimated statewide totals indicate a 
probable net tax shift to residential, vacant land, and farm property 
classes from the commercial, apartment, industrial, and utility classes. 
Reappraisal will shift the property tax in the direction of a land or site 
value tax, although tax levies on improvements will still be substantial. 
It is hazardous to generalize from these statewide totals to a specific 
local situation because there is so much variation among assessing units.
Once a number of revaluation programs have been completed in many 
assessing units, it will be possible to determine whether particular 
classes of taxpayers are unduly burdened. A major impact of full-value 
assessment will be a reduction in the value of many partial exemptions for 
many property owners. The benefits of veterans and other exemptions that 
are based on fixed dollar amounts will be reduced substantially in some 
jurisdictions, since assessments are currently based on partial rather than 
full value. If these groups are heavily impacted, some sort of relief —  
perhaps in the form of strengthened circuit-breakers —  could be granted by 
the State Legislature.
p. 17.40/ Governor Hugh L. Carey, op. cit.,
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Administration of the property tax in New York State is currently 
undergoing a major overhaul. More than 40 percent of the parcels outside 
of the New York City area have been revalued, or are in the process of 
being revalued, to meet the full-value standard. In this rapidly changing 
environment, it would seem prudent to be cautious in adopting large-scale 
relief programs such as the circuit—breaker. When major steps have been 
achieved in refining the administration of the property tax, careful con­
sideration should be given to implementing programs, such as circuit- 
breakers, that relieve "excessive burden." Adoption of major relief 
programs before revaluation programs are widespread is probably premature.
Temporary State Commission on Real Property Tax. In response to 
recent court decisions and other developments relating to real property 
taxes, the 1977 Legislature created a temporary state commission on the 
real property tax. The commission's charge was to "make a comprehensive 
review of the administration and application of the real property tax and 
shall make such recommendations as it may find necessary to assure that the 
burden of taxation is equitably distributed while sound social, economic 
and governmental purposes are served." The commission was required to 
produce a report by December 31, 1978.—
Among other tasks, the temporary commission was expected to review the 
desirabi1ity and feasibility of circuit —breaker programs, fractional 
assessments, and classified levies. The commission was also charged with 
examining the specific financial impacts of existing property tax 
exemptions and the effectiveness of these exemptions in promoting social 
policy.
41/ At the time of this paper was written the Commission had not produced 
a report.
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Alt hough It is easy to be cynical about temporary commissions and 
their likely impace on policy, the climate in the State appears favorable 
for meaningful change. Circuit-breaker legislation enacted in 1978 is 
limited in scope, coverage and cost. This program was enacted with 
apparently little consideration of basic issues and long-term consequences. 
Henry Aaron1 s observation of the rapid nationwide acceptance of the cir­
cuit-breaker concept is applicable to the New York experience: "Rarely has 
policy been so unequivocally supported by such dubious analysis."— ^
There is much agitation to do something about the property tax. The 
unholy fact is that the push to change the property tax has far outstripped 
analysts* ability to examine the effects of various "reforms." In the New 
York context, impatience for change should be tempered to allow careful and 
thorough analysis of the property tax as presently administered and the 
impact of full value assessment. The temporary commission on the real 
property tax provides an avenue for comprehensive review that can establish 
the background necessary to develop cogent tax policy. Expansion or 
modification of the present circuit-breaker program before the task of the 
temporary commission is accomplished and its findings and recommendations 
are carefully scrutinized would be premature.
Conclusion. The circuit-breaker concept is appealing on many grounds, 
not the least of which is its political attractions. Circuit-breakers are 
flexible enough to allow close matching between policy objectives and 
program implementation. They hold promise of alleviating what is often 
believed to be the most onerous aspect of property taxation —  undue burden 
in relation to current annual income.
42/ Henry Aaron, op, cit., p. 53.
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Despit e these advantages, it is difficult to be enthusiastic at this 
time about widespread application of circuit-breakers in New York State. 
Local government finance, particularly the property tax, is currently 
undergoing major and significant change. State legislation with respect to 
the property tax has been dominated by short-term response to immediate 
issues. The present circuit-breaker program falls into the category of 
"band-aid" legislation. Once the process of improving property tax 
administration has been accomplished and the basic problems of the property 
tax system are identified, the circuit-breaker can be viewed in its proper 
context. At that point, perhaps true reform rather than relief can be
attained.
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a p p e n d i x A - COSTS AND PARTICIPATION RATES OF STATE PROPERTY TAX 
CIRCUIT-BREAKER PROGRAMS: FISCAL YEARS 1974 AND 1977*
State
Total Cost 
of programs ($000)
Number of 
claimants
Average cost 
per claimant
Cost per 
capita
1974 1977 1974 1977 1974 1977 1974 1977
Arizona N. A. $ 7,762 N.A. 38,619 N.A. $200.19 N.A. $ 3.45
Arkansas $ 166 676 2,798 8,916 $ 59.34 75.76 $ .08 0.36
California 61,000 85,000 302,000 440,000 201.98 193.18 2.96 2.74
Colorado 2,355 11,003 27,251 58,875 86.41 187.00 0.96 4.20
Connecticut 6,193 24,754 19,533 101,574 317.05 243.70 2.10 7.96
D. C. N.A. 600 N.A. 6,000 N.A. 100.00 N.A. 0.87
Hawaii 4,200 - N.A. - N.A. - 4.65
Idaho 1,871 4,000 15,924 17,323 117.49 231.00 2.42 4.67
Illinois 21,950 100,000 144,647 405,000 151.74 250,00 1.95 8.85
Indiana 1,800 844 44,000 28,665 40.90 29.45 0.33 0.16
Iowa 2,540 9,600 37,000 83,800 68.64 114.56 1.26 3.34
Kansas 3,149 8,824 31,307 62,955 100,58 140.17 1,38 3.84
Maine 1,974 4,347 13,468 20,786 146.56 209.10 1.92 4.06
Maryland - 20,808 - 83,863 - 248.12 - 5.03
Michigan 129,000 275,582 810,000 1,234,800 159.25 223.18 14.26 30.24
Minnesota 10,010 134,200 . 110,000 857,277 91.00 156.54 ’2.56 33.94
Missouri 4,709 7,008 58,031 56,260 81.14 124.57 0.98 1.46
Nevada 80 1,350 1,994 10,560 40.12 127.84 0.14 2.20
New Mexico - 1,500 - 40,000 37.50 - 1.26
New York. - N.A. - N.A. - N.A. - N.A.
North Dakota 35 1,198 5,052 9,969 70.00 120.20 0,55 1.86
Ohio 33,000 44,614 264,300 329,462 124.86 135.42 3.20 4.26
Oklahoma N.A. 357 N.A. 4,159 N.A. 85.93 N.A. 0.13
Oregon 70,730 74,140 509,000 502,575 138.95 147.52 31.78 31.20
Pennsylvania 56,100 58,918 410,000 413,974 136,82 142.32 4.71 4.99
Rhode Island - 12 1 / - 249 - 51.92 0.01
South Dakota - 1,487 - 15,095 - 98.51 - 2.17
Utah - 950 - 10,000 - 95.00 - 0.75
Vermont 4,731 7,670 16,400 36,516 288.47 210.05 10.19 16.08
West Virginia 166 18 8,529 1,265 19.46 13.94 0.09 0.01
Wisconsin 35,411 48,139 189,521 234,201 186.84 205.55 7.75 10.31
Total U 446,970 939,561 3,020,755 5,112,738 147.97 183,77 4.41 6.83
Percent increase 110.2 69.3 24.2 54.9
*For several states data are for other than year indicated, see Appendix B.
N.A. - Not available* New program for year indicated.
No circuit-breaker program in 1974.
U  New program, data for period January 1 thru April 10. 
2 J  21 states in 1974, 29 states plus D.C. in 1977. 
Source: Shannon and Tippett, (1978), op, clt., p. 10.
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Footnotes for Appendix B - Key Features of State Circuit-Breaker Property
Tax Relief Programs, April 1978.
1/ The number of beneficiaries and cost data are for the fiscal years 
shown in parenthesis.
2/ Relief currently takes the form of cash refunds as those having an
~  income tax liability fail to qualify for property tax rebate.
3/ Homeowners in Connecticut now have the option of circuit~breaker 
relief or a property tax freeze. Both programs reduce tax bill*
4/ The program was expanded by 1977 legislation to include all home­
owners. The fiscal year 1979 cost has been estimated at approximately 
$60 million.
5/ In 1974 Michigan extended circuit-breaker coverage to farmers as well 
as owners of residential property. Farmers must agree to restrict 
land use to obtain relief, however.
6/ The maximum credits are increased by $200 for the elderly and
“  disabled. All credits shall be reduced by any state paid homestead 
credits provided under Section 273.13(6) and (7). (Maximum credit 
$675 less the homestead credit).
7/ Claimants may not own Nevada realty, other than their own home, 
assessed at over 30,000.
8/ North Dakota has a separate program which lowers the assessed value of 
low-income elderly homeowners by as much as $3,000.
9/ In determining a person's income for eligibility, the amount of 
medical expenses incurred and not compensated for shall be deducted.
10/ Low-income senior citizens (age 58 and over with income under $5,000) 
are provided optional rental assistance.
11/ The number of beneficiaries, average benefits, and cost data are for 
property or sales tax refunds to the elderly or disabled. Age and 
income requirements are the same for both programs. Applicants can 
receive either a property or a sales tax refund. The Department of 
Revenue processes the claims for both programs and refunds whichever 
is to the applicants advantage. Separate data by program is not 
available.
12/ For purposes of calculating the credits, household income is reduced 
by $600 if the claimant, spouse or any dependent of the claimant is 65 
years of age or older.
Source: Shannon and Tippett, (1978), op. cit., p. 10.
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